Products Lemma APIProof issuance & verification platformTrust402Delegate to agents, and transactSealSign-in for the agent era — no keys handed over
Use cases Manufacturing & Critical InfraInspection Record AssuranceFinance & FinTechCounterparty Record VerificationPublic SectorCertificate-less ProceduresHealthcareQualified Worker AssuranceProcurement & Supply ChainSupplier Credential MonitoringMedia & ContentContent AuthenticityService & RetailCross-group IdentityAI Adoption (cross-industry)AI Run GovernanceDevelopers & Agent OpsAgent Authority Control ▸ Browse the use-case index
Pricing
Resources Critical BriefThe frontier of AI × trustBlogThinking and implementation notesDocumentationAPI & specsVerification CenterReal verification & issuance countsAbout usFRAME00, Inc.ContactSales & press inquiriesGlossaryDefinitionsFAQFrequently asked questions
Dashboard ↗ JA
Home / Critical Brief / No. 071
No. 071 Critical Brief · Agent Authority Proof

DJI ROMO: A researcher reported that one authenticated connection reached other people's robot vacuum cameras and microphones (researcher's report, Malwarebytes)

~7,000units
ROMO units reported to have responded to one researcher's connection (Malwarebytes and others)
24+countries
Countries where responding units were located (Malwarebytes)
02-08→02-10
According to reports, from DJI's initial fix to its supplementary fix
CountryGlobal
Incident date2026-02-17
Published2026-06-19
AuthorsLemma Critical Team
Contents
  1. 01Summary
  2. 02What got through
  3. 03Pre-execution check
  4. 04What Lemma does
  5. 05Facts and timeline
  6. 06Sources

Summary

The researcher reportedly did nothing more than connect to the cloud as a user, with an app he had built to drive his own unit. Authentication passed, but, according to the technical writeup, which units’ data a connection could receive was not separated per unit. Fixes were rolled out, but some reported issues were said to be still unpatched at the time of reporting. Authenticating a connection without checking which unit it may see lets one connection reach every unit.

Exhibit 1Detection vs pre-execution check

A pre-execution check means checking, before handing over video and audio, that the party holds permission for that unit. Detection means noticing afterwards that other people's units were reachable. The dates below are the reported fix and report dates, not when other people's units became reachable.

Pre-execution check · not known from the disclosuresBefore a subscription, check that the party holds permission for that unit
What was confirmedOne authenticated connection received
other units' video and audio (researcher's report)
Detection · partialThe researcher found it; DJI rolled out fixes
2026-02
Researcher finds it and tells DJI
02-08
DJI rolls out an initial fix
02-10
DJI completes a supplementary fix
02-17
Press reports

What got through

What got through
Subscribing to unit topics over one authenticated connection. Malwarebytes explained that the MQTT broker had no topic ACL, so an authenticated connection, bound to no specific unit, could also subscribe to other units’ topics.
What reached the receiving side
In general, a broker that allows subscriptions on authentication alone receives the owner’s subscription and an unrelated user’s subscription as the same “authenticated subscription.” According to the researcher’s report, live camera video, microphone audio and floor-map data from each unit were reachable by an unrelated user’s connection.
Not disclosed
Whether anyone other than the researcher received other people’s unit data by the same route, and whether there is a record of which connection received what (the reports we consulted do not say).

Pre-execution check

Whatever the route, the condition for telling them apart is that the side handing over unit data checks, before handing it over, whether the receiving party is one the unit’s owner has permitted.

The core of this case
Authenticating a connection without checking which unit it may see lets one connection reach every unit.
Who approves
The unit’s owner (the user), who permits, unit by unit, which accounts or devices may view it. The vendor provides a way to issue that permission per unit.
Where it is checked
The part of the cloud that relays a unit’s video, audio, floor maps and commands (such as the MQTT broker). Before a subscription or command, it checks that the party holds permission for that unit, and does not pass subscriptions that lack it. Having passed authentication is not enough on its own.
What is recorded
Which party received which data from which unit, under which permission.

The researcher found and reported it, and DJI rolled out fixes. But fixes come after discovery, and video and audio that have already been delivered cannot be taken back. Similar cases are the DeepSeek database (an unauthenticated database was exposed, so reaching it meant reading it) and Unitree’s robots (every unit used the same key, with no per-unit key).

What Lemma does

Lemma builds the pre-execution check into the part of the cloud that relays a unit’s video, audio and commands. It does not look for intrusions; it checks, before handing over data, that the subscribing party holds permission from that unit’s owner.

Industries and operations to watch

IndustryManufacturing & critical infrastructure
Organizations that build appliances or robots with cameras and microphones and deliver their video and audio to users through the cloud.
OperationLookup & data access
Making a unit’s video, audio and floor-map data viewable from the user’s app. How far an authenticated party’s access extends across units is the deciding point.

Current controls vs Lemma

The route in this case is column 2 (subscribing to other units’ video, audio and floor maps). Column 1, connecting to the cloud, is what the researcher did for his own unit, and authentication passed.

Control Connecting to the cloud Subscribing to other units’ video, audio and floor maps
User authentication Effective Not effective
Broker topic ACL Not relevant Effective
After-the-fact log analysis Not relevant Partial
Lemma (pre-execution check) Not relevant Effective

User authentication confirms who the connecting party is, but does not decide which units that party may see. A broker topic ACL limits which topics each party can subscribe to; Malwarebytes explained that there was none. After-the-fact log analysis can, in general, reconstruct which connection subscribed to which topic, but cannot take back video and audio already delivered. Lemma checks, before a subscription, that the party holds permission issued by that unit’s owner, and records that the check was made.

Note: Lemma’s check works only where the vendor builds it into the part that relays a unit’s video and audio, and makes owner permission issuable per unit. It passes if the owner’s device or account, or the permission itself, is stolen. Other reported routes, such as the camera PIN bypass, each need their own fix. The table compares what each control checks; it does not show whether this incident would have been stopped. Lemma does not detect or prevent intrusions.

CheckChecklist

Three things to confirm for organizations that build or deploy connected devices

  • Does your product’s cloud limit the units a connected party can subscribe to or control to the units that party is permitted to use?
  • Do you record which party received video or audio from which unit?
  • Do you have a channel for vulnerability reports from outside researchers, and a procedure for shipping fixes?

Facts and timeline

Target
DJI’s ROMO robot vacuum, with its units, phone app and cloud backend. Placed in homes, it handles a camera, a microphone and floor maps.
Discovery
Researcher Sammy Azdoufal. While analyzing the app’s communications with AI coding tools in order to drive his own ROMO with a PS5 controller, he reportedly noticed that when his homemade app connected to DJI’s backend, many other units responded. He told DJI via The Verge.
What was confirmed (researcher’s report)
About 7,000 ROMO units (in at least 24 countries) responded, and live camera video, microphone audio and floor-map data were reachable by an unrelated user.
What it required
Not owning individual units, but being able to connect to the backend as an “authenticated client.”
Explanation of the cause
Malwarebytes explained that the MQTT broker had no topic ACL, so an authenticated connection, bound to no specific unit, could subscribe to any unit’s topics.

Glossary
MQTT broker — A server that relays messages between devices and apps. Devices publish data to destinations called topics, and apps subscribe to topics to receive it.
ACL (access control list) — A list that sets which parties may subscribe or publish to which topics.
Authentication vs authorization — Authentication confirms who the connecting party is. Authorization decides what that party is allowed to do, and on which unit.

Timeline

  • The researcher notices that many other units respond to his homemade app’s connection, and tells DJI via The Verge.
  • According to reports, DJI rolls out an initial fix.
  • According to reports, DJI completes a supplementary fix.
  • Malwarebytes and DroneXL report.
  • PetaPixel reports.
  • DroneDJ reports the fix and the bounty.

The facts here rest on Malwarebytes’ technical writeup and on reporting by PetaPixel, DroneXL and DroneDJ. This is a researcher’s discovery and disclosure; this Brief blames neither a malicious actor nor the manufacturer. Scale and fix dates are stated as reported. The use of AI coding tools is a fact about the analysis method; this Brief’s concern is how per-unit authorization was separated. What has not been disclosed does not mean no controls existed.

Response after disclosure

DJI
According to reports, it resolved the ROMO MQTT broker’s authorization-validation issue with an initial fix on 2026-02-08 and a supplementary fix on 02-10, and paid the finder a $30,000 bounty (for one finding).
Remaining issues
Some reported issues, including a camera-feed PIN bypass, were said to be still unpatched at the time of reporting (Malwarebytes, DroneXL).

Sources

References: “The last layer left for cyber defense in the age of AI”

The same method elsewhereSee all 28 "Lookup & data access" cases

This Brief sets out, from disclosed facts, what organisations in a similar position can check. It is not guidance on individual losses or procedures.

This material is a structured analysis of public information; it is not an audit, diagnosis, or recommendation for any specific organization.

Cite this Brief

Lemma Critical Team. (2026).
"DJI ROMO: A researcher reported that one authenticated connection reached other people's robot vacuum cameras and microphones (researcher's report, Malwarebytes)".
Lemma Critical Brief No.071. Lemma / FRAME00, Inc.
https://lemma.frame00.com/critical/briefs/071-dji-romo-robot-vacuum-no-acl/
Read nextNext
All Briefs →
Lemma

If it can't be verified,
it doesn't enter your operation.

Lemma is a pre-execution check: logins, payments, records and publishing that look genuine are checked before they run, with cryptographic proofs the receiving side verifies without asking the issuer. Detection stays; the check sits in front of it.