Summary
- 01What happened
According to the police, the email appeared to come from a supplier and asked for payment for goods to a new account. The sender’s address differed from the supplier’s by one character, and staff did not notice.
- 02What was found
The firm found out only when the real supplier said it had not been paid. Most of the money was later frozen through cross-border cooperation, but the transfer itself went through.
- 03Why it got through
A payment to a new account goes through, even on a request from a lookalike address, unless the account is checked with the supplier’s registered contact.
A pre-execution check means confirming, before using a new account named in a request, that it was approved through the supplier's registered contact, and keeping a record. Detection means learning after the transfer that the supplier was never paid. Dates rely on the Singapore Police Force release.
$39M was frozen
What got through
- What got through
- A transfer made as payment to a supplier for goods. It went to a new account at a bank in Timor-Leste named in the email, and the amount was $42.3 million (Singapore Police Force release). INTERPOL describes the email as asking for a pending payment to be sent to a new account.
- What reached the paying side
- In general, the paying side sees the supplier’s name, the sender’s address, what the payment is for and the destination account. An address that differs by one character is hard to spot from the display alone. According to the police, staff did not notice the difference.
- Not disclosed
- The names of the firm and the supplier. Whether the requested amount matched a real transaction. Who approved the payment to the new account, and through what steps. How the fraudsters learned of the transaction and the supplier (whether the supplier’s or the firm’s email was compromised). How much was finally returned to the firm, and when.
Pre-execution check
Whatever the route, the condition for telling them apart is that whoever pays a supplier checks, before transferring, that a new account named in the request was approved by that supplier through its registered contact, not through the email that arrived.
Before transferring, check the new account in the request with the supplier's registered contact, not the email that arrived.
- Who approves
- The supplier. When a new account is used or an account is changed, it approves the account through its registered contact (not a contact given in the request’s email).
- Where it is checked
- The approval step before a transfer is executed. When the account in a request differs from the registered account, nothing is sent and the payment is held until it can be checked against the supplier’s approval. This is checked separately from reviewing what the payment is for.
- What is recorded
- Which request’s account was used for a transfer, and who checked it through which contact. That record can show, for recovery, investigation, insurance or audit, what was checked before the money was sent.
The firm noticed four days after the transfer. A similar case of paying on a request from an address made to look like a vendor’s is the City of Liberty, Texas (about $600,000 wired against a request matching a real debt). Here the amount was about 70 times larger, the request itself pointed to a new overseas account, and most of the money was frozen within days through cross-border cooperation. Other cases where a supplier payment went to another account are Zephyr Energy and Ovid Therapeutics (a development partner’s email was compromised).
What Lemma does
Lemma builds the pre-execution check into the side that transfers money on payment requests. It does not look for spoofed emails; it checks, before transferring, that the account named in a request was approved through the supplier’s registered contact.
Industries and operations to watch
- IndustryProcurement & supply chain
- Firms that pay large single amounts to overseas suppliers, as in commodity trading. Payment requests arrive by email, and destinations may cross borders.
- OperationBank account changes
- A new account named alongside a payment request.
- OperationApproval
- Approving transfers to suppliers for goods.
Current controls vs Lemma
The route in this case is column 1 (a request to pay a new account from an address made to look like the supplier’s). Column 2 covers the same request arriving from the supplier’s genuine, compromised email; nothing disclosed says that happened here. Column 3 covers a takeover of the supplier’s registered contact itself.
| Control | Request from a lookalike address | Request from the supplier’s genuine email | Takeover of the registered contact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Checking the sender’s address (reading the display) | Partial | Not effective | Not effective |
| Reviewing what the payment is for | Partial | Partial | Not effective |
| Post-transfer freezing and recovery by banks and law enforcement | Partial | Partial | Partial |
| Lemma (pre-execution check) | Effective | Effective | Not effective |
Checking the sender’s address can miss a one-character difference, and according to the police it was not noticed here; a compromised genuine mailbox shows no difference at all. Reviewing what the payment is for cannot easily tell a request apart if it follows a real transaction (the request’s contents here were not disclosed). Freezing and recovery by banks and law enforcement act after the transfer and do not stop it (here most of the money was frozen after it was sent). Lemma checks the account named in the request, not the address or the payment’s contents, against the supplier’s approval through its registered contact, before transferring.
Note: Lemma’s check works only when it is built into the approval step before a transfer and the supplier’s approval comes through a registered contact or key managed apart from the request’s email. It passes if the registered contact itself has been taken over. The table compares what each control checks; it does not show whether this incident would have been stopped. Lemma does not detect or prevent intrusions, and it does not freeze or recover funds already sent.
Three things to confirm about transfers to suppliers
- Do you hold the first transfer to an account in a different country or bank than before until the check is complete?
- Do you check the address of a payment-request email against the supplier’s registered address with a system, not by eye?
- If a transfer is found to have gone to the wrong place, is there a set procedure to report it to the bank and the police immediately?
Facts and timeline
- Party
- A commodity firm based in Singapore (name not disclosed).
- What happened
- An email that appeared to come from a supplier asked for payment for goods to a new account at a bank in Timor-Leste. The sender’s address differed from the supplier’s by one character, and staff did not notice. The firm sent $42.3 million to that account.
- How it was found
- The real supplier said it had not received the payment. The firm reported to the police the same day.
- Impact and recovery
- The police engaged the Timor-Leste authorities and INTERPOL, and $39 million was frozen in the Timor-Leste account. The Timor-Leste authorities recovered over $2 million more and later arrested seven suspects in total. The police say the Anti-Scam Centre, working with the Timor-Leste authorities and INTERPOL, recovered over $40 million, and that steps are being taken to return the funds to the firm.
Glossary
Business email compromise (BEC) — A scam that uses emails posing as a business partner or executive to request a payment or an account change. The police release uses this term.
I-GRIP — INTERPOL's Global Rapid Intervention of Payments, a mechanism for quickly stopping payments across borders. Launched in 2022 (INTERPOL).
Timeline
- Staff at the firm receive an email that appears to come from a supplier, asking for payment to a new account in Timor-Leste.
- The firm sends $42.3 million to that account.
- The real supplier says it has not been paid. The firm reports to the police, who engage the Timor-Leste authorities and INTERPOL through I-GRIP.
- The police Anti-Scam Centre is told that $39 million has been frozen in the Timor-Leste account.
- The Timor-Leste authorities report arrests and the recovery of over $2 million.
- The Singapore Police Force announces the case and the recovery.
- INTERPOL announces the case and the recovery.
The facts rely on the Singapore Police Force release (primary) and the INTERPOL release (primary). The date of word of the freeze follows the police release (July 24); the body of the INTERPOL release gives July 25. The names of the firm and the supplier, whether the requested amount matched a real transaction, the firm’s approval steps, and how much was finally returned and when have not been disclosed. What has not been disclosed does not mean there were no controls.
After disclosure
- Singapore Police Force: The Director of the Commercial Affairs Department said scams are a global threat that requires a global response, and thanked INTERPOL and the Timor-Leste authorities.
- Timor-Leste authorities: The Scientific Police Criminal Investigation, the National Intelligence Services, the Financial Intelligence Unit and other agencies investigated and arrested seven suspects in total (police release).
- INTERPOL: Describes I-GRIP as a mechanism that uses its member countries’ police network to speed up requests for help in financial crime cases.
Sources
- Primary, police releaseSingapore Police Force “International Cooperation Leading To The Biggest Recovery Of Over USD 40 Million Linked To Business Email Compromise Scam”
- Primary, INTERPOL release, French editionINTERPOL “La police récupère plus de 40 millions d’USD à la suite d’une escroquerie internationale par courriel”
References: “The last layer left in AI-era cyber defense”