Summary
- 01What happened
The invoice came from the vendor contact’s genuine email account, through the vendor’s own mail server, not from a lookalike address. It billed for work that had actually been delivered; only the bank account was different.
- 02What was found
It was noticed only after the vendor’s accounting team billed again for the same job.
- 03Why it got through
When an invoice comes from the vendor’s genuine mailbox and describes a real transaction, no amount of reading the email or the invoice tells you whether the bank account belongs to the vendor.
A pre-execution check means matching, before the transfer and apart from email, the invoice's bank account to the vendor's registered account, and keeping a record. Detection means noticing after the transfer that the account was fake. The transfer date and the date it was noticed have not been disclosed. Months are from the company's disclosure.
Accounting paid the fraudster's account
What got through
- What got through
- A transfer made on a payment request in the name of a vendor (a US-based manufacturing contractor, “Company A” in the disclosure). The accounting department, asked by the staff member who received it, paid the designated account, which belonged to the fraudster (Modalis disclosure).
- What reached the paying side
- In general, a payment request arrives with the vendor’s name, the transaction, the amount and a bank account. Here the sender’s address and the sending mail server were also the vendor’s genuine ones. The company infers that after taking over the account, the fraudster watched the correspondence for some time and understood the commercial terms, the relationship and the payment timing before sending.
- Not disclosed
- The subsidiary’s name and location. How Company A’s account was taken over. The amount and date of the transfer, and the amount recovered. Whether the account on the invoice differed from earlier transactions. The loss-sharing ratio and the insurance payout. Investigators have not identified the fraudster.
Pre-execution check
Whatever the route, the condition for telling them apart is that, before paying and apart from the email received, the bank account on the invoice is checked against that vendor’s registered account.
Before transferring, check the bank account on the invoice against the vendor's registered account, not against the email that arrived.
- Who approves
- The vendor. When an account is newly registered or changed, it approves through its registered contact. The vendor’s email itself can be taken over, as here, so the approval comes through a channel other than email.
- Where it is checked
- The step before accounting carries out the transfer. The bank account is matched to the vendor’s registered account, separately from reviewing the invoice’s contents (transaction and amount). Transfers to accounts that cannot be matched are held.
- What is recorded
- Which invoice was paid to which account, and how it was checked, so you can show what was checked when dealing with bank refunds, loss-sharing talks with the vendor and insurance claims.
The fake account was found only after the transfer had gone through. Similar cases, where a payment to a vendor went to another account, are the City of Liberty, Texas (the request came from a lookalike vendor domain) and Zephyr Energy (a single contractor payment was diverted).
What Lemma does
Lemma builds the pre-execution check into the side that pays vendors. It does not look for hijacked mailboxes; it confirms, before the transfer, that the invoice’s bank account is one that could be matched to the vendor’s registered account.
Industries and operations to watch
- IndustryHealthcare
- Drug-discovery companies that outsource research and development manufacturing to overseas contractors, with frequent changes to specifications and terms and invoices that often arrive by email.
- IndustrySupply chain
- Organisations that pay invoices emailed by contractors they have dealt with many times.
- OperationBank account changes
- Registering and changing vendors’ bank accounts (whether the invoice’s account differed from earlier ones has not been disclosed).
- OperationApproval
- Transfers to vendors that accounting carries out at a staff member’s request.
Current controls vs Lemma
The route in this case is column 1 (an invoice for a real transaction from the vendor’s genuine email). Column 2 is the case where the vendor’s registered account itself has been altered.
| Control | Invoice for a real transaction from the vendor’s genuine email | Vendor’s registered account itself altered |
|---|---|---|
| Checking the invoice’s contents (transaction, amount, timing) | Not effective | Not effective |
| Checking the email’s sender (address, domain) | Not effective | Not effective |
| Two-factor authentication on your own email | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| Checking after the transfer, and the bank freezing the account | Partial | Partial |
| Lemma (pre-execution check) | Effective | Not effective |
Checking the contents does not settle it: the invoice was for work actually delivered, so the more accurate it was, the more genuine it looked. Checking the sender cannot tell it apart, because the email came from the vendor’s genuine account and mail server. Two-factor authentication on your own email, which the company lists among its measures, protects your own accounts; the account taken over was the vendor’s. Checking after the transfer and freezing the account led to recovering most of the amount here, but it acts after the transfer. Lemma checks the bank account, not the email or the invoice’s contents, against the vendor’s registered account before paying.
Note: Lemma’s check works only when it is built into the step before the transfer and the vendor’s registered account is kept apart from the invoice email. It passes if the registered account itself has been altered. The same applies if account changes are approved through the hijacked email. The table compares what each control checks; it does not show whether this incident would have been stopped. Lemma does not detect or prevent email account takeovers.
Three things to confirm about invoices that vendors send by email
- Do you confirm the registration or change of a vendor’s account with that vendor through a channel other than email (such as a registered phone number)?
- Do you have a step that stops, before the transfer, an invoice whose bank account differs from the registered account?
- If an account is found to be fake after a transfer, is there a set procedure to contact both the sending and the receiving bank immediately?
Facts and timeline
- Party
- A subsidiary of Modalis Therapeutics (Tokyo Stock Exchange Growth market, code 4883). The disclosure does not name the subsidiary or its location.
- Vendor
- A US-based manufacturing contractor (“Company A” in the disclosure). The company says there had been several transactions before the incident, with frequent exchanges about changes to specifications and terms.
- What happened
- Work was ordered from Company A in early 2023 and actually delivered in late August; in late November a payment request arrived by email in Company A’s name. Company A’s contact’s official email account had been taken over by some means, and the fraudster sent it from Company A’s mail server. The accounting department paid the designated account.
- How it was found
- Company A’s accounting department billed again for the same transaction; the company checked the transfer and found the destination was the fraudster’s account.
- Recovery and loss
- The company contacted the local authorities and both banks and succeeded in having the fraudster’s account frozen. After several months, the banks refunded what they could recover. After talks with Company A, both sides agreed to share the loss in a set ratio, and an electronic-fraud insurance claim was partly paid. The final loss was $90,000 (about ¥14 million), expected to be booked as an extraordinary loss for the fiscal year ending December 2024.
- Personal data
- The company says customer information it holds was not leaked.
Glossary
Manufacturing contractor — An outside company contracted to manufacture a company's products or materials. Here, a company based in the US whose name is withheld in the disclosure ("Company A").
Email account takeover — A third party gets into someone's email account and can send and receive as that person. The emails come from the genuine address and the genuine mail server.
Timeline
- Early 2023
- The subsidiary orders work from Company A.
- Late August 2023
- Company A delivers.
- Late November 2023
- A payment request arrives from Company A’s hijacked email; accounting pays the designated account.
- Discovery date (not disclosed)
- Company A’s accounting bills again; checking the transfer shows the destination was the fraudster’s account. The account is frozen.
- 2025-01-06
- The company discloses the incident in a timely disclosure on the Tokyo Stock Exchange.
The facts rely on Modalis’s timely disclosure (primary). The disclosure gives the year once, with the order in early 2023, and we read the months of delivery and the payment request as falling in the same year. That the fraudster watched the correspondence is the company’s inference. The amount transferred, the amount recovered, the loss-sharing ratio and the insurance payout have not been disclosed. What has not been disclosed does not mean there were no controls.
After disclosure
- Modalis: Says it will enforce password protection and two-factor authentication on its email and other communication tools, and, allowing for the same thing happening on the vendor’s side, confirm through more than one channel when sending money and review its internal transfer process. It says it keeps discussing electronic-fraud countermeasures with its banks and frequently receives approaches that appear to be fraud aimed at it. Investigators are working on the case but have found no strong leads to the fraudster.
Sources
- Primary, timely disclosureModalis Therapeutics「当社子会社における資金流出被害の発生と特損計上に関するお知らせ」 (Notice of loss of funds at a subsidiary and extraordinary loss, in Japanese, 2025-01-06)
References: “The last layer left in AI-era cyber defense”