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Home / Critical Brief / No. 175
No. 175 Critical Brief · Regulatory Attribute Proof

Storm-2657: Staff accounts at US universities were taken over and payroll deposits redirected in the HR system (Microsoft report)

11 accounts
Staff accounts Microsoft observed as compromised since March 2025 (at three universities)
~6,000
Email accounts that received phishing sent from the compromised accounts (across 25 universities)
Undisclosed
University names, losses, and how many deposits were actually redirected (not in Microsoft's report)
CountryUS
Incident date2025-10-09
Published2026-11-05
AuthorsLemma Critical Team
Contents
  1. 01Summary
  2. 02What got through
  3. 03Pre-execution check
  4. 04What Lemma does
  5. 05Facts and timeline
  6. 06Sources

Summary

  1. 01What happened

    What was changed was not a payment to a vendor but employees’ own salary deposits. According to Microsoft, the attacker registered their own phone as an authentication device on the hijacked accounts. They changed the salary deposit and hid the change notification emails with inbox rules.

  2. 02What was found

    The changes arrived from the employee’s own account, through the real screens. Microsoft says this does not represent a vulnerability in Workday’s products. The universities and the losses have not been disclosed.

  3. 03Why it got through

    Even when a login succeeds in the employee’s name, a change to where their salary is paid cannot be confirmed as theirs unless it is approved with a key that was already theirs before the change.

Exhibit 1Detection vs pre-execution check

A pre-execution check means checking, before a salary deposit change is confirmed, that it is the employee's, using a key registered before the change, and keeping a record. Detection means noticing the takeover or change afterwards. The dates of device registration and deposit change have not been disclosed. Dates shown are the period Microsoft gave and its publication date.

Pre-execution check · not known from the disclosuresBefore confirming a deposit change, check it against the employee's existing key
What was confirmed11 accounts taken over at three universities
Salary deposits redirected (number not disclosed)
Detection · worked afterwardsMicrosoft investigates the takeovers and publishes the method and mitigations
2025-03 on
Staff accounts taken over
Date not disclosed
Attacker's phone registered as an authentication device
Date not disclosed
Deposit changed; notification emails hidden
10-09
Microsoft publishes its report

What got through

What got through
Changes to employees’ salary deposit accounts in the HR system (Workday). The attacker signed in to Workday through single sign-on from hijacked staff accounts and changed the payroll bank account details (Microsoft).
Also on the same accounts
Registering the attacker’s phone number as a multi-factor authentication device (through the Workday profile or Duo settings), which Microsoft says let them keep access without further approval from the employee. Inbox rules were also created to hide or delete Workday’s notifications of the change.
What reached the receiving side
In general, the HR system sees a deposit change from a session signed in to the employee’s account. A successful login does not show that the employee made the change.
Not disclosed
The universities. The losses, and how many deposits were actually changed and salaries sent elsewhere. Whether any pay was recovered. Whether a check beyond login was required for the deposit change. The order and interval between registering the device and changing the deposit.

Pre-execution check

Whatever the route, the condition for telling them apart is that, before a salary deposit change is confirmed, it is checked as the employee’s own against the key or contact registered before the change.

Pre-execution gate
Before changing a salary deposit account, check that the change is the employee's own with the key registered before it, not a newly registered device.
Who approves
The employee. They approve the new deposit account, shown to them, with a key (such as a passkey) or contact registered before the change. The approval takes a form that a newly added authentication device or the screen that accepted the change cannot produce.
Where it is checked
The HR or payroll system that confirms deposit changes. A change made right after a new authentication device is registered is held rather than confirmed. A change that does not match an approval is held the same way, and matched to the employee before the next payroll cutoff.
What is recorded
Whose deposit changed, through which step, approved by which device, and when it was confirmed.

Change notifications go to the hijacked mailbox. Once inbox rules hide them, they never reach the employee. Registration details being changed through real screens without checking the owner is common to Booking.com payout account tampering (a hotel’s payout account was changed in its admin screen) and the City of Baltimore (a supplier’s bank account was switched in Workday). Here the target was not a vendor but employees’ own pay.

What Lemma does

Lemma builds the pre-execution check into the side that confirms salary deposit changes. It does not look for intrusions; it checks, before confirming, that an incoming change was approved with a key the employee had registered before the change.

Industries and operations to watch

IndustryGovernment & public sector
Universities and public bodies where many staff can change their own salary deposit in a cloud HR system. Microsoft notes that any SaaS holding HR or payment and bank account information could be targeted the same way.
OperationBank account changes
Registering and changing staff salary deposit accounts.
OperationAccounts & permissions
Registering and changing multi-factor authentication devices on staff accounts.

Current controls vs Lemma

The route in this case is column 1 (salary deposit changes) and column 2 (authentication device registration). Column 3 covers the phishing emails sent from hijacked accounts to other staff and universities.

Control Salary deposit changes Authentication device registration Email sent from hijacked accounts
Phishing-resistant MFA (Microsoft’s recommendation) Partial Partial Partial
Email notifying a deposit change Partial Not applicable Not applicable
Takeover detection and reverting changes Partial Partial Partial
Lemma (pre-execution check) Effective Partial Not applicable

Phishing-resistant MFA protects sign-in; it does not look at what happens after sign-in succeeds. Notification emails help the employee notice later, and if the receiving mailbox is hijacked, inbox rules can hide them. Detection and reverting act after the fact. Lemma checks the deposit change itself, not the sign-in, against the employee’s existing key before it is confirmed. The same check can be built into device registration, but an employee’s first registration, with no existing key, passes.

Note: Lemma’s check works only when it is built into the HR or payroll system that confirms deposit changes. The approving key must have been registered before the change, apart from the screen accepting the change and from any newly added device. It passes if the existing key itself is stolen. Changes HR staff make on an employee’s behalf also pass unless the check is built in there too. Takeovers and outgoing phishing are not stopped by this check. The table compares what each control checks; it does not show whether this incident would have been stopped. Lemma does not detect or prevent intrusions.

CheckChecklist

Three things to confirm about staff salary deposit changes

  • Do you have a step that holds, before confirming, a deposit change made right after a new authentication device is registered?
  • When a salary deposit changes, does a notice also reach a channel other than the employee’s mailbox?
  • Can you notice when an inbox rule that moves or deletes HR or payroll notices is created?

Facts and timeline

Reporter
Microsoft Threat Intelligence, which tracks a financially motivated actor it calls Storm-2657.
Targets
US organisations, especially higher education, aiming at HR SaaS profiles such as Workday. The universities have not been named.
What was confirmed
Since March 2025, 11 compromised staff accounts at three universities. The compromised accounts were used to send phishing to nearly 6,000 email accounts across 25 universities (Microsoft).
How access was gained
According to Microsoft, credentials were harvested through phishing emails. Some accounts had no multi-factor authentication; on others, MFA codes were intercepted.
In the HR system
The attacker entered Workday through single sign-on and changed payroll bank account details. They registered their own phone numbers as MFA devices and used inbox rules to hide or delete Workday’s change notifications (Microsoft).
On Workday
Microsoft says the attacks do not represent any vulnerability in the Workday platform or products. Workday has published guidance for customers in its community (Microsoft).
Losses
The losses and the number of deposits actually changed have not been disclosed.
A similar warning
In July 2024, Washington State University urged all employees to check their deposit details after phishing gave scammers some employees’ credentials and their Workday direct deposits were changed (university announcement). Neither source links that case to Storm-2657.

Glossary
Workday — A cloud service for HR, payroll, procurement and more. Staff can register and change the bank account for their salary in their own profile.
Payroll pirate — Industry name for taking over an employee's account and changing their salary deposit to an attacker's account in the HR system.
Inbox rule — A mailbox setting that automatically moves or deletes incoming mail that meets given conditions.

Timeline

2024-07-01
Washington State University warns that employees’ salary deposits were changed and urges staff to check them (no link to Storm-2657 is stated).
2025-03
Microsoft begins observing Storm-2657 taking over staff accounts (11 accounts at three universities).
First half of 2025
A campaign targeting Workday profiles is observed (Microsoft).
2025-10-09
Microsoft publishes its report on Storm-2657.

The facts rely on Microsoft Threat Intelligence’s report (primary). It gives the number of compromised accounts and universities. It does not give the universities’ names, the losses, or how many deposits were actually changed. Washington State University’s announcement (primary) concerns a separate case of the same kind. No link to Microsoft’s report is shown. What has not been disclosed does not mean there were no controls.

After disclosure

  • Microsoft: Recommended passwordless, phishing-resistant MFA (FIDO2 keys, passkeys and similar). For compromised identities it recommended resetting credentials and revoking sessions, reviewing and re-registering MFA devices, reverting unauthorised payroll changes and removing malicious inbox rules, and it published hunting guidance.
  • Workday: Published guidance for customers in its community (Microsoft).

Sources

  1. Primary, research reportMicrosoft Threat Intelligence “Investigating targeted “payroll pirate” attacks affecting US universities”2025-10-09 · microsoft.com/en-us/…
  2. Primary, university announcementWashington State University “WSU employees urged to check direct deposit information”2024-07-01 · a separate case of the same kind · news.wsu.edu/news/…

References: “The last layer left in AI-era cyber defense”

The same method elsewhereSee all 16 "Payee & bank-account changes" cases

This Brief sets out, from disclosed facts, what organisations in a similar position can check. It is not guidance on individual losses or procedures.

This material is a structured analysis of public information; it is not an audit, diagnosis, or recommendation for any specific organization.

Cite this Brief

Lemma Critical Team. (2026).
"Storm-2657: Staff accounts at US universities were taken over and payroll deposits redirected in the HR system (Microsoft report)".
Lemma Critical Brief No.175. Lemma / FRAME00, Inc.
https://lemma.frame00.com/critical/briefs/175-storm-2657-university-payroll-diversion/
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