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Home / Critical Brief / No. 193
No. 193 Critical Brief · Agent Authority Proof

Amadeus: At the airlines' reservation system provider, unauthorised access with a system account's credentials ran for about three years, and booking data of JAL, ANA, Cathay Pacific and others was viewed (airline disclosures)

2023-08→2026-09
Period during which unauthorised access with a system account's credentials ran in Amadeus's systems (Cathay Pacific's disclosure)
About 92,000customers
JAL and JTA customers whose booking data shows signs of having been viewed (about 2,000 of them with email, phone and passport numbers too; JAL's disclosure)
About 37,800customers
ANA customers whose booking data shows signs of having been viewed (about 1,700 of them with passport and ticket numbers too; ANA's disclosure)
CountrySpain / Japan
Incident date2026-09-23
Published2026-11-08
Revised v1.1 · 2026-11-09
AuthorsLemma Critical Team
Contents
  1. 01Summary
  2. 02What got through
  3. 03Pre-execution check
  4. 04What Lemma does
  5. 05Facts and timeline
  6. 06Sources

Summary

  1. 01What happened

    In the systems of Amadeus (Spain), which provides passenger service systems to airlines, a third party used login credentials assigned to one of Amadeus’s system accounts to access reservation data without authorisation (Cathay Pacific’s disclosure). The access ran from August 2023 to September 2026. JAL and JTA say about 92,000 customers, ANA about 37,800 customers and Cathay Pacific about 53,000 bookings show signs of having been viewed.

  2. 02What was found

    Most of what was viewed was booking references, names, travel dates, routes and classes; a smaller part also included email addresses, phone numbers and passport numbers. Card data and passwords were not included. Amadeus says it became aware of a vulnerability in a “booking display environment”, invalidated the credentials and strengthened monitoring. The airlines say their own systems were not affected.

  3. 03Why it got through

    A query with valid credentials goes through indefinitely, without showing whose work it is for.

Exhibit 1Detection vs pre-execution check

A pre-execution check means checking, before reservation data is read, which airline's work the query is for, and keeping a record. Detection means noticing the unauthorised access and invalidating the credentials. Dates rely on the disclosures by Cathay Pacific, JAL and ANA.

Pre-execution check · not known from the disclosuresCheck a query against the airline's record of work requests before reading
What was confirmedAbout three years of unauthorised access
About 92,000 JAL, 37,800 ANA customers and 53,000 Cathay bookings
Detection · worked after about three yearsCredentials invalidated, vulnerability fixed, airlines notified
2023-08
Unauthorised access with the system account's credentials begins
2026-09
End of the access period
10-23 to 28
Amadeus notifies JAL, Cathay and others
10-28 to 30
JAL, ANA and Cathay disclose

What got through

What got through
Queries of reservation data held in Amadeus’s systems. According to Cathay Pacific, they were made by a third party using login credentials assigned to Amadeus’s system account, from August 2023 to September 2026. In its statement, Amadeus says it became aware of a vulnerability affecting a travel booking display environment, and that certain booking-display data was accessible through it.
What reached the accepting side
In general, a shared reservation system receives only a system account’s credentials and the query itself (a booking reference or a name). It does not receive which airline’s work the query is for (ticketing, check-in, customer service). If the credentials are valid, the connection is accepted as legitimate, even for three years.
Not disclosed
How the credentials were obtained (the relation between the vulnerability and the credentials). The role and scope of the system account. How many queries were made and how many bookings were viewed in total. When Amadeus became aware (the disclosure dates differ by airline). How the viewed data was used (the airlines say no misuse has been confirmed).

Pre-execution check

Whatever the route, the condition for telling them apart is that, before reservation data is read, the query is checked as resting on a specific airline’s work request, against a record of requests kept apart from the system account’s credentials.

Pre-execution gate
Before reservation data is read, check which airline's work the query is for, against a record of requests rather than a system account's credentials.
Who approves
The airline that owns the data. For each kind of work (ticketing, check-in, customer service) it sets the scope of queries (which bookings, which period, which fields) and issues requests in a form the provider’s system account cannot produce.
Where it is checked
The step in the provider’s system that accepts and executes a query. Even with valid credentials, a query not tied to the record of requests, or one beyond the scope (count, period, fields), is held. This is checked on every query, apart from the credentials’ expiry.
What is recorded
Which account read which airline’s bookings, under which request. It is kept apart from the provider’s system, so each airline can check the impact on its own customers itself.

It was noticed after about three years, and the airlines say their own systems were not affected. Cases where a provider’s or vendor’s credentials went through without showing which customer’s request they served include Yumirlink (the provider’s staff credentials) and ConnectWise (a vendor’s app credentials). A case where a lawful lookup right pulled large volumes of data is Denmark’s CPR, and one where a former employee’s key stayed active is Illuminate Education. Here, one provider’s system account read the bookings of several airlines over three years.

What Lemma does

Lemma builds the pre-execution check into the side of the provider’s system that accepts and executes queries of reservation data. It does not look for unauthorised access; it checks, before reading, that a query rests on an airline’s work request.

Industries and operations to watch

IndustryProcurement & supply chain
Companies that hold reservation, customer or inventory data in a provider’s system shared by several companies. One system account at the provider reaches every company’s data.
IndustryRetail & services
Airlines, travel and hospitality businesses that leave their reservation systems to an outside provider, holding passport numbers and contact details for customers.
OperationData access
Queries and exports of reservation data from the provider’s system.
OperationAccounts & permissions
Issuing, expiring and revoking system account credentials.

Current controls vs Lemma

The route in this case is column 1 (queries with the provider’s system account credentials). Column 2 covers a takeover of an airline employee’s account, and column 3 a query by the provider’s own staff within their rights; nothing disclosed says either happened here.

Control Provider’s system account credentials Takeover of an airline employee’s account Query by the provider’s own staff
Regular rotation and revocation of credentials Partial Not effective Not effective
Multi-factor authentication on employee logins Not effective Effective Not effective
Monitoring and detection on access logs Partial Partial Partial
Lemma (pre-execution check) Effective Not effective Effective

Regular rotation shortens how long stolen credentials work, but they pass until the next rotation (here the access ran for about three years). Multi-factor authentication protects a person’s login but is often absent on system account connections. Monitoring and detection notice after the query, and here that took about three years. Lemma checks, before reading, not whether the credentials are valid but whether the query rests on a work request.

Note: Lemma’s check works only when it is built into query execution in the provider’s system and the record of work requests is managed apart from the provider’s system accounts. If an employee’s account is taken over and the request record is forged too, it can pass. The table compares what each control checks; it does not show whether this incident would have been stopped. Lemma does not detect or prevent intrusions, and it does not recover data already viewed.

CheckChecklist

Three things to confirm about customer data held in a vendor’s system

  • Do you know the scope (count, period, fields) of your customer data that the vendor’s system accounts can read?
  • Do you record the vendor’s queries tied to your own work requests, so you can check them yourself later?
  • When the vendor suffers unauthorised access, can you establish the impact on your customers from your own records, without waiting for the vendor’s report?

Facts and timeline

Parties
Amadeus IT Group, S.A. (Spain; provides passenger service systems to airlines) and the airlines using its systems. This Brief relies on the disclosures it confirmed: Japan Airlines (JAL) and Japan Transocean Air (JTA), All Nippon Airways (ANA), and Cathay Pacific. Press reports say Korean Air, Asiana Airlines, Singapore Airlines, Malaysia Airlines and others have also disclosed an impact.
What happened
According to Cathay Pacific, in Amadeus’s systems a third party using login credentials assigned to Amadeus’s system account accessed reservation data without authorisation between August 2023 and September 2026. In its statement, Amadeus says it became aware of a vulnerability affecting a travel booking display environment through which certain booking-display data was accessible, that there is no evidence payment or financial data was accessed, and that there are no indications of exploitation for ransomware.
How it was found
JAL and JTA were told by Amadeus on 23 October. Cathay was notified on 28 October and received details on the 29th. ANA says it was told by Amadeus (no date given). Amadeus’s statement does not say when it became aware.
Impact and response
JAL and JTA say that, among booking records held in the vendor’s system from 10 August 2023 to 23 September 2026, about 90,000 customers’ booking references, names, travel dates, routes and classes, and about 2,000 customers’ email addresses, phone numbers, passport numbers, nationality and mileage numbers in addition, show signs of having been viewed; no card numbers or passwords leaked, and no misuse or operational impact has been confirmed. ANA says that, of about 37,800 customers who booked in the same period, about 36,100 had names, booking references, travel dates, routes and classes viewed, and about 1,700 also had email addresses, phone numbers, passport numbers, nationality, mileage numbers, ticket numbers and seat numbers viewed; it was told the credentials concerned have been invalidated and monitoring strengthened. Cathay says about 53,000 bookings were affected, mostly booking references, names and flight details, with a smaller subset possibly including email, phone, travel document and frequent flyer numbers; Amadeus reset passwords and enhanced monitoring, and has found no evidence of misuse. All three say their own systems were not affected.

Glossary
Passenger service system — The system that handles an airline's reservations, ticketing and check-in together. Many airlines share a provider's system, such as Amadeus's.
System account — An account used not by a person but by systems or services to connect to each other. Its credentials tend to stay in use for a long time and often lack the multi-factor authentication that a person's login has.

Timeline

2023-08
Unauthorised access with the system account’s credentials begins in Amadeus’s systems (start of the period given in Cathay Pacific’s disclosure).
2026-09-23
End of the period of booking records covered by JAL and ANA. Cathay’s disclosure puts the access up to September 2026.
Early October 2026
Amadeus issues its statement (dated only “October 2026”).
2026-10-23
JAL and JTA are told by Amadeus.
2026-10-28
JAL and JTA disclose. Amadeus notifies Cathay.
2026-10-29
Amadeus gives Cathay further details. ANA discloses that some booking data shows signs of having been viewed through unauthorised access to Amadeus’s systems (numbers still being verified).
2026-10-30
ANA discloses the numbers and data items. Cathay discloses.

The facts rely on the disclosures of JAL and JTA, ANA and Cathay Pacific, and on Amadeus’s statement (all primary). On the means of access, Cathay writes of “login credentials assigned to its system account” while Amadeus writes of “a vulnerability affecting a travel booking display environment”; how the two relate has not been disclosed. The impact on other airlines rests on press reports and is not covered in detail here. The total number of bookings viewed, the number of queries and the date Amadeus became aware have not been disclosed. What has not been disclosed does not mean there were no controls. This Brief does not evaluate the companies’ responses. Written as of 5 November.

After disclosure

  • Amadeus: Says it fixed the vulnerability, enhanced monitoring and detection, and is in direct dialogue with customers and authorities. In its report to Cathay it says it contained the incident, including a password reset.
  • JAL, JTA and ANA: Are contacting affected customers in turn, by the email address given at booking and other means, and warn of suspicious emails, calls, fake sites and social media advertisements impersonating them.
  • Cathay Pacific: Informed the relevant authorities, is analysing the data received from Amadeus, and will notify affected customers individually.

Sources

  1. Primary, company disclosureJapan Airlines and Japan Transocean Air「Amadeus社が提供する旅客サービスシステムへの不正アクセスについて」2026-10-28 · jal.co.jp/ja-jp/news/general/2026/other/261028
  2. Primary, company disclosureAll Nippon Airways「Amadeus社 旅客サービスシステムへの不正アクセスについて」2026-10-30 · ana.co.jp/ja/jp/special-notice/001612
  3. Primary, company disclosureCathay Pacific “Personal data security incident involving a third-party service provider”2026-10-30 · cathaypacific.com/cx/…
  4. Primary, company statementAmadeus “Amadeus statement” (October 2026)amadeus.com/amadeus-statement-oct
2 more (reporting, analysis)
  1. PressAviation Wire「JALとJTA、アマデウス不正アクセスで予約情報9.2万人対象 クレカやパスワード流出なし」2026-10-28 · aviationwire.jp/archives/353202
  2. PressAviation Wire「ANA、アマデウス不正アクセスで予約情報参照か」2026-10-29 · aviationwire.jp/archives/353245

References: “The last layer left in AI-era cyber defense”

The same method elsewhereSee all 21 "Account takeover" cases

This Brief sets out, from disclosed facts, what organisations in a similar position can check. It is not guidance on individual losses or procedures.

This material is a structured analysis of public information; it is not an audit, diagnosis, or recommendation for any specific organization.

Cite this Brief

Lemma Critical Team. (2026).
"Amadeus: At the airlines' reservation system provider, unauthorised access with a system account's credentials ran for about three years, and booking data of JAL, ANA, Cathay Pacific and others was viewed (airline disclosures)".
Lemma Critical Brief No.193. Lemma / FRAME00, Inc.
https://lemma.frame00.com/critical/briefs/193-amadeus-system-account-airline-booking-data/
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Revision History

Current version: 1.1

Lemma

If it can't be verified,
it doesn't enter your operation.

Lemma is a pre-execution check: logins, payments, records and publishing that look genuine are checked before they run, with cryptographic proofs the receiving side verifies without asking the issuer. Detection stays; the check sits in front of it.