Financial Data Exfiltration Defense
Make cross-organization data access logs tamper-proof with ZK proofs, so you can independently verify who accessed what and when — and answer audit requests with confidence.
Three voices from the front line.
- CISO / security operations
“We want to alert on suspected financial-data exfiltration, but can't send raw data to the SOC”
- Forensics / SOC
“We want to detect unauthorized access and exfiltration without touching the sensitive data itself”
- Legal / compliance
“For incident reporting, we want to prove what was exfiltrated without the raw data”
Hand over the source, or just the facts?
Nothing changes on the floor. Everything changes for the receiver.
① Your team just saves, as always.
- The usual step
- Fill in the record and save
- On save
- A proof is attached (API, behind the scenes)
- The document itself
- never sent
② They just open a link.
- Proven fact
- happened inside authorized access controls
- the contents of the data accessed
- not shown
- Login / keys
- not needed
- The document stays private — the record itself is never sent or disclosed.
- Independent verification — the receiver just opens a link. No account, no keys.
- Edits are detected — even a one-character edit fails verification.
For every cross-organization data access, who accessed what and when is fixed as a tamper-proof record. The customer data itself never leaves; regulators, the originating org and the receiving org can each independently verify the same record. The gap that sat between detection (DLP) and log aggregation (SIEM) — "tamper-proofness of the record itself" and "a shared truth across organizations" — is filled with verifiable facts.
See the technical details ↗Why the usual methods fall short.
Only work that needs all three at once — pass without exposing, independent verification, tamper-evidence — is Lemma's domain.
| Method | Pass without exposing | Independent verification | Tamper-evident | What happens |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Access control / permissions | △ | ✗ | ✗ | “Someone inside could have edited it” remains possible |
| Masking / redacted copies | △ | ✗ | ✗ | Redaction work grows; the original is still unproven |
| Encrypt and store / send | ✓ | ✗ | ✗ | To verify, the receiver needs it disclosed after all |
| SIEM / DLP monitoring only | △ | ✗ | ✗ | Detection only — the receiver still cannot verify independently |
| Lemma (ZK proof)the only one with all 3 | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | The receiver just opens a link |
How it works — and how to start.
We help design disclosure scope and retention, run the PoC, and support production.
Start with a 30-minute call.
Tell us one workflow where "logs exist but we can't be sure they're untampered" applies, in the first 30 minutes. No disclosure of sensitive data required.
Related Use Cases
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Run it yourself.
No sales call needed — start hands-on with Lemma's products.