Financial Data Exfiltration Defense
Make cross-organization data access tamper-evident with ZK proofs.
Three voices from the front line.
- CISO / security operations
“We want to alert on suspected financial-data exfiltration, but can't send raw data to the SOC”
- Forensics / SOC
“We want to detect unauthorized access and exfiltration without touching the sensitive data itself”
- Legal / compliance
“For incident reporting, we want to prove what was exfiltrated without the raw data”
Hand over the source, or just the facts?
Change what reaches the AI, and the leakage risk goes with it.
- tx_id:
- TX-001
- account:
- 9876-…
- amount:
- ¥10,000,000
- counterparty:
- Acme Co.
- memo:
- …
- holder:
- did:lemma:org-acme-finance
- issuer:
- did:lemma:internal-monitor
- jurisdiction:
- JP
- licenseType:
- access-attestation
- disclosed:
- [anomaly_rule-3, impact_segment_A]
- hidden:
- [account, amount, counterparty, memo]
- ZK verified:
- ✓ VALID
For every cross-organization data access, who accessed what and when is fixed as a tamper-proof record. The customer data itself never leaves; regulators, the originating org and the receiving org can each independently verify the same record. The gap that sat between detection (DLP) and log aggregation (SIEM) — "tamper-proofness of the record itself" and "a shared truth across organizations" — is filled with verifiable facts.
See the technical details ↗Choose on three criteria.
Only work that needs all three at once — pass without exposing, independent verification, tamper-proof — is Lemma's domain.
| Method | Pass without exposing | Independent verification | Tamper-proof |
|---|---|---|---|
| Access control only | △ | ✗ | ✗ |
| Masking / anonymization | △ | ✗ | ✗ |
| Encryption only | ✓ | ✗ | ✗ |
| SIEM / DLP monitoring only | △ | ✗ | ✗ |
| Lemma (ZK proof)the only one with all 3 | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
What's next
We enter through access-trail design for cross-organization access and a PoC, and stay alongside you through to operations.
- A 30-minute review — identify cross-organization data-access workflows (secondment, contractor, agency) where the logs can be disputed.
- Narrow to 1–2 decisions (results) to prove — e.g. "who accessed which record, and when" — the facts you want preserved as tamper-evident. Not the customer originals.
- Design connection and trail-fixing — connection to your existing CRM, database, and DLP/SIEM, and tamper-evident fixing of the access trail.
- Prove one access path via a (quote-based) PoC.
- Hands-on support from rollout through operations — existing plan tiers (Civic / Critical / Compliance) serve only as a cost reference; the setup and pricing are designed together.
Tell us one workflow where "logs exist but we can't be sure they're untampered" applies, in the first 30 minutes. No disclosure of sensitive data required.
The bigger picture
The bigger picture this use case belongs to.
We map use scenarios across industries and workflows by the four axes.
See use scenarios for Regulatory Attribute in Solutions →TRY LEMMA
Run it yourself.
No sales call needed — start hands-on with Lemma's products.