Agentic Payment Fraud
Attach a ZK proof to every AI-agent payment call — who delegated, within what scope, and up to what limit — so the receiving side can verify the delegation cryptographically before settlement, instead of trusting an API key.
For teams running AI agent payments
The risk of agent payments clearing on nothing but an API key and a prompt-engineered guardrail, resolved by independent verification of delegation and spend limits before settlement.
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Security leads at organizations starting to embed AI agents into operational workflows
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Developers and operators running payments over x402 / MCP / A2A environments
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Compliance owners responsible for audit and control of agent-driven actions
Hand over the source, or just the facts?
Nothing changes on the floor. Everything changes for the receiver.
① Your team just saves, as always.
- The usual step
- Fill in the record and save
- On save
- A proof is attached (API, behind the scenes)
- The document itself
- never sent
② They just open a link.
- Proven fact
- each payment stayed within an authorized delegation
- the agent's keys and the intermediate delegation steps
- not shown
- Login / keys
- not needed
- The document stays private — the record itself is never sent or disclosed.
- Independent verification — the receiver just opens a link. No account, no keys.
- Edits are detected — even a one-character edit fails verification.
Lemma attaches a Trust402 attestation to every payment an agent issues. Inside the attestation: the principal that delegated the action, the role and scope of the delegation, a per-call spend limit, and any jurisdiction attribute the counterparty needs to verify (e.g. "this agent acts on behalf of a JP-registered entity").
The attestation is a ZK proof, not a bearer credential. The agent never carries the principal's keys. The receiving side — be it a settlement contract, an x402 middleware, or a counterparty's risk engine — verifies the proof before clearing the payment, against an on-chain registry of the principal's delegation policy. Revocation propagates the same way: a single transaction at the principal's level invalidates every downstream attestation that depended on it.
The result is that "who delegated, within what scope, against which jurisdiction" stops being an after-the-fact reconstruction problem and becomes a precondition for settlement.
Why the usual methods fall short.
Only work that needs all three at once — pass without exposing, independent verification, tamper-evidence — is Lemma's domain.
| Method | Pass without exposing | Independent verification | Tamper-evident | What happens |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Access control / permissions | △ | ✗ | ✗ | “Someone inside could have edited it” remains possible |
| Masking / redacted copies | △ | ✗ | ✗ | Redaction work grows; the original is still unproven |
| Encrypt and store / send | ✓ | ✗ | ✗ | To verify, the receiver needs it disclosed after all |
| Lemma (ZK proof)the only one with all 3 | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | The receiver just opens a link |
How it works — and how to start.
We help design disclosure scope and retention, run the PoC, and support production.
Start with a 30-minute call.
Tell us one delegation path where settlement risk is concentrated, in the first 30 minutes. No agent implementation details or production payload required.
Related use cases
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Run it yourself.
No sales call needed — start hands-on with Lemma's products.