Supply Chain Component Provenance
Chain per-lot component provenance — issuer-signed at every supplier tier — into a ZK proof the assembler can verify.
Who this is for.
Are you still receiving component provenance (country of origin, manufacturing lot, modification history) as Excel sheets and supplier-submitted PDFs, then aggregating internally? Does it feel like there's no structural way to detect tampering several tiers back?
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Procurement leads and supply chain management at manufacturers (automotive, electronics, industrial equipment)
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Quality assurance teams setting up traceability and recall-response evidence at the component level
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Teams building per-component provenance chains for Digital Product Passport (DPP) compliance
Hand over the source, or just the facts?
Change what reaches the AI, and the leakage risk goes with it.
- component_id:
- COMP-ABC-001
- part_name:
- motor control board
- supplier_tier_1:
- Corp A
- supplier_tier_2:
- Corp B
- supplier_tier_3:
- Corp C
- batch:
- 2024-Q3-15
- subject:
- did:lemma:component-COMP-ABC-001
- issuer:
- did:lemma:supplier-A
- sourceHash:
- 0x3c8d…f7a2
- lineageChain:
- [tier-3, tier-2, tier-1, assembly]
- recordedAt:
- 2024-08-15T08:00:00Z
- integrity:
- poseidon-merkle
- ZK verified:
- ✓ VALID
Lemma lets every supplier tier issue component attributes (country of origin, manufacturing lot, modification history, quality test results) as issuer-signed attestations, with per-component cryptographic links to upstream tiers. Supplier names, contract terms, and cost data stay under the issuer's control. What crosses to the receiving side is only a ZK proof: "this part was produced in a certified Tier-3 facility," "this lot passed the specified test threshold."
Autonomous procurement agents can verify the per-component provenance chain as a ZK proof before confirming an order. Tampering attempts, counterfeit lot injection, and gray-market entry are structurally detectable as chain-integrity breaks — execution stops at the boundary without tracing all the way upstream manually.
How this provenance chain fits your procurement structure and DPP / traceability requirements is what we map out in a first conversation.
Choose on three criteria.
Only work that needs all three at once — pass without exposing, independent verification, tamper-proof — is Lemma's domain.
| Method | Pass without exposing | Independent verification | Tamper-proof |
|---|---|---|---|
| Access control only | △ | ✗ | ✗ |
| Masking / anonymization | △ | ✗ | ✗ |
| Encryption only | ✓ | ✗ | ✗ |
| Lemma (ZK proof)the only one with all 3 | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
How it works
Tell us how your procurement is wired today and which component attributes carry the most provenance risk. We'll explore together whether Lemma's component-provenance chain could fit your operations. No supplier contracts or cost information required.
Related Use Cases
The bigger picture
The bigger picture this use case belongs to.
We map use scenarios across industries and workflows by the four axes.
See use scenarios for Verifiable Origin in Solutions →TRY LEMMA
Run it yourself.
No sales call needed — start hands-on with Lemma's products.